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SCALING CHINESE WALLS: INSIGHTS FROM AFTRA V. 
JPMORGAN CHASE 
ABSTRACT 
The material non-public information financial services firms receive 
from clients utilizing commercial banking services may often prove bene-
ficial to the firm’s trust account clients if the information is used in making 
investment decisions for these trust accounts. Consequently, financial ser-
vices firms confront two equally dubious options: to utilize the information 
to benefit the trust account client and break insider trading laws, or to 
disregard the information and seemingly violate the firm’s fiduciary duty to 
the trust account client. To successfully defend against either of the above 
claims, firms should establish and maintain effective Chinese Walls between 
private and public side departments and demonstrate that decisions made 
with respect to private and public side clients are not tainted by conflicting 
interests. A recent case tried in the Southern District of New York, Aftra v. 
JPMorgan, provides an opportunity to inspect these problems in light of the 
2008 financial crisis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),1 which repealed 
important portions of the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA),2 broadened the activi-
ties that depository banks may engage in by establishing the label of finan-
cial holding companies.3 The expected consequence of the GLBA was the 
consolidation of financial services into a few large, and often international, 
banking corporations.4 
As purveyors of a variety of financial products, these companies are privy 
to material nonpublic information (MNPI) relating to their clients’ business 
operations and future economic outlook, such as when a corporate borrower 
provides the lending institution with financial statements and future expected 
cash flows.5 Occasionally, information gained by one division in administer-
ing its duty to clients may prove useful to another division in making busi-
ness decisions that would impact the banking corporation, a separate client, 
or both.6 The advantageous transfer of MNPI between departments7 was 
prohibited by an early case8 brought under the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) Rule 10b-59 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.10 
                                                 
1 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 
1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). 
2 Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) 
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
3 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(p), 1843(l)(1) (2006). Financial holding companies are permitted to 
engage in activities financial in nature or incidental thereto, as well as complementary fi-
nancial activities that do not pose a substantial risk to the safety and soundness of the 
institution. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1). After 1999, financial holding companies were al-
lowed to underwrite securities, offer all types of insurance policies, participate in market 
securities transactions as a broker-dealer, provide advisory services, act as trustee, and 
manage trust fund investments and other financial services. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4). 
4 See Group of Ten, Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector, at 1–3 (2001), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten05.pdf (inspecting the systemic risk of a limited 
number of interrelated and interdependent financial institutions). 
5 Id. at 16, 238. 
6 Id. at 27. 
7 Division and department are used synonymously. Any common points of distinction 
are disregarded for the purposes of this Note. Here, departments are characterized and 
distinguished by the activities in which financial holding companies are permitted to 
engage. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4). 
8 Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC 907 (Nov. 8, 1961) 
(dealing with the use of inside information acquired by a trustee in making investment 
decisions for the trust). Although the inside information came to the trustee from an out-
side source, not an internal department, the ruling effectively prohibited a trustee from 
using MNPI acquired from any source. See id. at 907–12. 
9 SEC Commodity and Security Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003) (prohibiting 
the use of manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the purchase of securities). 
10 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006). 
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Conflicts of interest in large financial holding companies are endemic 
to the industry,11 and may take on two forms: a conflict between the firm’s 
own economic interests12 and those of its clients, or a conflict between the 
interests of different types of clients of the financial institution.13 In either 
form it is the use, not possession, of MNPI in making investment and 
business decisions that is illegal.14 In an attempt to preempt and combat 
the transfer of MNPI between divisions, financial services companies es-
tablish and monitor compliance procedures.15 
One technique firms can use to avoid the transfer of MNPI is to con-
struct Chinese Walls16 between the public and private sides of the firm.17 
The effectiveness of Chinese Walls in permitting the exchange of MNPI 
has been a debated topic18 since insider trading was recognized in Cady, 
                                                 
11 See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Public Confidence and the Banking System: The Policy Basis 
for Continued Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 
647, 676 (1986). 
12 A firm’s interests are most often manifested in proprietary trading activities for the 
firm’s own account. The Volcker Rule, a component of the Dodd-Frank Act yet to be 
enforced as of early 2013, attempts to prohibit proprietary trading by banking entities. 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 619, 124 Stat. 1621 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851). 
13 Ingo Walter, Conflicts of Interest and Market Discipline Among Financial Services 
Firms 3 (NYU Stern Sch. of Bus. Asset Mgmt. Research Grp., Working Paper No. SC
-AM-03-08, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1295
181 (discussing the potential conflicts of interest that financial services firms face and 
proposing a taxonomy to constrain the exploitation of these conflicts by focusing on the 
impact of market discipline and external regulation). 
14 See Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of 
Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1332–35 (1999). The Cady, 
Roberts decision in 1961 appeared to reject the trader’s argument that his possession of 
the inside information alone did not constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5. To resolve this 
issue, the court in Adler imposed an inference of use when a trader possesses inside 
information, and it placed the burden of proof on the trader, not the SEC or the plaintiff. 
See SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1336–38 (11th Cir. 1998). 
15 See Wesley G. Nissen, Key Compliance Issues, in HEDGE FUNDS 2008, at 245, 343 
(PLI Corporate Law and Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1672, 2008). See generally 
Editorial by Harvey L. Pitt, Conflict of Interest Lessons from Financial Services, COMPLIANCE 
WKLY., Feb. 22, 2005, http://www.complianceweek.com/conflict-of-interest-lessons-from
-financial-services/article/183272/. 
16 The terms firewall and information barrier are synonymous with Chinese Walls. 
17 See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 10A INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL 
MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION § 19:35 (2012). Private-side participants engage 
in activities where MNPI is gained, such as commercial lending or underwriting securities. 
The public side activities consist of advisory services and securities trading. Id. 
18 See id. § 19:37; see also DIV. OF MARKET REG., SEC, BROKER-DEALER POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES DESIGNED TO SEGMENT THE FLOW AND PREVENT THE MISUSE OF MATERIAL 
NONPUBLIC INFORMATION 18 (1990), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/market
 
2013] SCALING CHINESE WALLS 771 
Roberts.19 The number of potential conflicts of interest increase as a firm 
broadens the variety of financial services it offers, especially when sales, ad-
visory, and underwriting functions are combined.20 Conflicts of interest have 
been cited as a contributing factor to the economic meltdown of 2008.21 
The economic meltdown of 2008 spurred a large amount of litigation 
against firms in the financial services industry.22 This Note inspects one such 
claim—Board of Trustees of Aftra Retirement Fund v. JPMorgan Chase 
Bank, N.A.23—where Judge Scheindlin found that JPMorgan (JPMC) did 
not violate its duties of loyalty or disclosure24 when it collected a substantial 
premium on repurchase agreements made between Sigma Finance (Sigma) 
and JPMC’s commercial lending division25 while Aftra Retirement Fund 
                                                                                                                         
reg/brokerdealerpolicies.pdf (identifying the minimum elements necessary for an efficient 
information barrier); ARNOLD S. JACOBS, 5C DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER 
SECURITIES LAWS § 12:154 (2012) (demonstrating the potentially embarrassing result of 
effective Chinese Walls when a bank’s commercial lending and trust departments take 
opposing positions in a company’s future financial outlook); Leo Herzel & Dale E. Colling, 
The Chinese Wall and Conflict of Interest in Banks, 34 BUS. LAW. 73, 74 (1978) (stating 
that Chinese Walls are the most effective solution for information flow in combined 
financial service firms); Carlos E. Mèndez-Peñate, The Bank “Chinese Wall”: Resolving 
and Contending with the Conflicts of Duties, 93 BANKING L.J. 674, 674 (1976) (dem-
onstrating that the implausible result of eliminating Chinese Walls would require complete 
divestment of some financial service firms’ activities); H. Nejat Seyhun, Insider Trading 
and the Effectiveness of Chinese Walls in Securities Firms, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 369, 369–
70 (2008) (testing the effectiveness of Chinese Walls by inspecting the impact of an 
investment banker’s presence on a corporation’s board of directors); Norman S. Poser, 
Conflicts of Interest Within Securities Firms, 16 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 111, 116–18, 123 
(1990) (asserting that Chinese Walls are useful in preventing flow of nonpublic informa-
tion, but they are not a complete solution); Christopher M. Gorman, Note, Are Chinese 
Walls the Best Solution to the Problem of Insider Trading and Conflicts of Interest in 
Broker-Dealers?, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 475, 475–76 (2004) (positing that insider 
trading by broker-dealers may be limited by Chinese Walls, but corporate tippers and tippees 
are not affected by these measures); Stephen Barr, What Chinese Wall?, CFO MAG., Mar. 1, 
2000, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/2988524/c_3046533?f=magazine_featured (outlining 
the risks of collusion between the research and underwriting departments of securities firms). 
19 Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC 907, 910–11 (Nov. 
8, 1961). 
20 See Di Lorenzo, supra note 11, at 683–85. 
21 Jacob Weisberg, What Caused the Economic Crisis?, SLATE (Jan. 9, 2010, 6:59 
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_big_idea/2010/01/what_caused
_the_economic_crisis.html. 
22 Steven A. Meyerowitz, Lessons Learned, 128 BANKING L.J. 97, 97 (2011) (discuss-
ing that increased litigation relating to the economic crisis motivated plaintiffs to also assert 
negligence claims to avoid contractual provisions that limit damages for breach of contract). 
23 Bd. of Trs. of Aftra Ret. Fund v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 806 F. Supp. 2d 662 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
24 Id. at 666. 
25 Id. at 665. 
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(Aftra), under the direction and advisement of JPMC’s securities lending 
division, lost nearly all of its investment in Sigma when it went bankrupt.26 
Integral to this inspection is the apparent conflict of interest between JPMC’s 
commercial lending and securities lending27 departments and the use of Chi-
nese Walls to prohibit the transfer of MNPI. 
This Note will: (1) offer background and historical information on com-
mercial repurchase agreements, securities lending/asset management ser-
vices, Chinese Walls, and the fiduciary duty of loyalty; (2) provide context 
to legal arguments by highlighting the elements of the Aftra v. JPMorgan 
claim; (3) analyze the Aftra v. JPMorgan court’s discussion of the use of 
Chinese Walls as a defense to claims for breach of the fiduciary duty of loy-
alty; (4) inspect an alternative line of argumentation that may have proven 
successful for Aftra; and (5) discuss two possible solutions to the Chinese 
Walls debate enlightened by the Aftra v. JPMorgan ruling. The implications 
of Aftra v. JPMorgan will impact many subsequent cases that deal with con-
flicts of interest within large financial services firms. 
This Note’s analysis highlights the importance of Chinese Walls in de-
fending against duty of loyalty claims. A financial services firm’s use of 
Chinese Walls, if functioning properly, permits it to reject a plaintiff’s claim 
that (1) the firm was acting in a dual and conflicted role when dealing with 
fiduciary assets and (2) MNPI was used in making public side investment 
decisions.28 Ironically, Aftra’s claim seeks to impose upon JPMC the re-
quirement to disregard, or scale, a Chinese Wall within its organization in 
order to benefit the fiduciary client’s assets.29 Two alternatives are available 
to eliminate or minimize the importance of Chinese Walls: (1) require the 
break-up and separation of large financial services firms such that there is 
no possibility for conflicts of interest between private and public side de-
partments, and (2) establish restricted and watch lists that serve to make 
both public and private side managers aware of a potential conflict of inter-
est between fiduciary and non-fiduciary clients.30 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Repurchase Agreements 
Repurchase (repo) agreements provide for the simultaneous sale of se-
curities with a contractual obligation to repurchase them in the future at a 
                                                 
26 Id. at 677. 
27 JPMC’s securities lending division performs trustee services by investing cash collat-
eral for clients. See infra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
28 Aftra, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 688. 
29 Id. at 693. 
30 See Gorman, supra note 18, at 494–97. 
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higher price.31 This transaction is best viewed as a loan in which Corpora-
tion A lends the sale price of the securities32 to Corporation B in exchange 
for an agreement that at a later date Corporation B will repay the sale price, 
with accumulated interest, to Corporation A, and Corporation A will return 
the securities to Corporation B.33 Eligible collateral includes Treasury secu-
rities and other readily marketable securities.34 One night is the most com-
mon duration for a repo agreement.35 
Repo agreements “are subject to haircuts that are based on the nature 
and value of the underlying securities, [and] the amount of such agreements 
in relation to ... marks-to-market.”36 These “haircuts” require the value of the 
securities sold to be 102%–103%37 of the sale price in order to protect the 
lender from a decrease in the asset’s value over the duration of the agree-
ment.38 The Bankruptcy Code affords derivative contracts (including repo 
agreements) special treatment that purportedly reduces systemic risk by fa-
cilitating settlement and clearing.39 
The United States repurchase market in mid-2008 exceeded $10 tril-
lion, or about 70% of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while the Eu-
ropean market was 65% of Euro area GDP at €6 trillion.40 Repo market 
                                                 
31 Michael J. Fleming & Kenneth D. Garbade, The Repurchase Agreement Refined: 
GCF Repo, CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN., June 2003, at 1, http://www.newyorkfed
.org/research/current_issues/ci9-6.pdf. 
32 The securities serve as the collateral for the loan. See id. at 1–2. 
33 See id. The difference between the repurchase price and the original sales price is 
the interest earned by the lending institution. See United States v. Manko, 979 F.2d 900, 
902 (2d Cir. 1992). 
34 See Fleming & Garbade, supra note 31, at 2. Readily marketable securities may 
consist of commercial paper, corporate securities, or loan mortgages. Michael A. Spielman, 
Whole Loan Repurchase Agreements: An Assessment of Investment Transaction Risks in 
Light of Continuing Legal Uncertainty, 99 COM. L.J. 476, 476 (1994) (comparing the 
differences in bankruptcy treatment between whole loan mortgage collateral and other more 
common collateral in repurchase agreements). 
35 Howard R. Schatz, The Characterization of Repurchase Agreements in the Context 
of the Federal Securities Laws, 61 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 290, 296 (1987) (discussing the 
implications of defining overnight repo agreements as securities instead of loans). 
36 THOMAS L. HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, 23 BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS 
UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW § 4:17 (2011). 
37 Matt Phillips et al., Heading for a ‘Haircut,’ WALL ST. J., July 28, 2011, at C1. Lenders 
typically require borrowers to give $102 in assets or U.S. Treasuries for $100 cash. Id. 
38 See MOORAD CHOUDHRY, THE REPO HANDBOOK 128, 149 (2d ed. 2010). 
39 See Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy 
Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 93–94 (2005) (arguing that 
special treatment of derivative contracts through an automatic stay in bankruptcy 
proceedings may increase, not decrease, systemic risk). 
40 Peter Hördahl & Michael R. King, Developments in Repo Markets During the 
Financial Turmoil, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2008, at 37, 39. 
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growth nearly doubled from 2000 to 2007, mostly due to increases in over-
night repo transactions.41 The 2008 subprime mortgage crisis tightened repo 
lending because lenders began to worry about the health of their own balance 
sheets.42 Companies who relied on the overnight repo market, often invest-
ment banks, suffered at the “mercy of lender sentiment.”43 The overnight repo 
market hit a breaking point in early 200844 when lending all but dried up and 
only the highest quality collateral was accepted.45 
B. Securities Lending/Asset Management 
Securities lending is a contractual agreement between two parties where 
the lender transfers securities to the borrower with the agreement that the 
borrower will return them on a later date.46 The borrower provides the 
lender with collateral against the value of the securities.47 Borrowers often 
engage in securities lending for the purpose of short selling, but other pur-
poses exist.48 
                                                 
41 Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 
23 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 77, 80 (2009). 
42 See Bryan J. Orticelli, Note, Crisis Compounded by Constraint: How Regulatory In-
adequacies Impaired the Fed’s Bailout of Bear Stearns, 42 CONN. L. REV. 647, 656 (2009). 
43 Id. 
44 See Brunnemeier, supra note 41, at 88. In March 2008, Bear Stearns “was suddenly 
unable to secure funding on the repo market,” which led to the eventual purchase of Bear 
Stearns by JPMorgan with assistance from the New York Federal Reserve. Id.; see also 
José Gabilondo, Leveraged Liquidity: Bear Raids and Junk Loans in the New Credit 
Market, 34 J. CORP. L. 447, 465 (2009) (stating it was the “refusal of Bear’s repo lenders to 
extend overnight loans that confirmed that Bear had a liquidity crisis”). 
45 See Hördahl & King, supra note 40, at 42–43. 
46 André Ruchin, Can Securities Lending Transactions Substitute for Repurchase 
Agreement Transactions?, 128 BANKING L.J. 450, 451 (2011). Lending agreements, at the 
discretion of the lender, may specify a fixed date for borrowers to return the securities or 
allow lenders to request them on demand. Id. 
47 See Susan F. Pollack & Craig H. Weaver, Legal Issues Impacting Securities Lending 
Activities of Banks, in EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES, at 217, 223 (PLI Commercial Law & 
Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 600, 1992). The most common form of collateral is 
cash, but U.S. Treasuries and other readily marketable assets are also accepted. Id. Fluc-
tuations in the value of the securities impact the collateral required of the borrower, which 
is increased or decreased according to daily adjustments by marking to market. Id. 
48 KEVIN A. ZAMBROWICZ, THE AM. LAW INST., SP054 BROKER-DEALER REGULATION 
37, 39 (2009) (“Borrowers may engage in securities lending ... to cover short sales or failed 
trades, or to execute hedging or arbitrage strategies.”). Ironically, although the parties have 
conflicting positions—the lender is long on the stock and the borrower is short—the lender 
allows its securities to be used in a bet by the borrower against the lender’s expectation that 
the securities will rise in value. 
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Securities lending agents49 are normally appointed by the securities lender 
to invest50 the cash collateral according to predetermined guidelines set by 
the lender.51 The level of discretionary investment authority the asset man-
ager is allowed by the security lender has liability implications, and it is an 
important issue to be resolved in the contractual documents of the lending 
and management agreements.52 
Asset managers are compensated by receiving a percentage of the gain 
in the invested collateral’s value, typically thirty to forty percent, but do not 
share in any losses experienced by the securities lender.53 Because the secu-
rity lender bears the risk of loss, the asset manager is required to invest “col-
lateral funds conservatively and prudently to safeguard principal and to 
maintain adequate liquidity.... [M]ost collateral pools are restricted to short-
term investments because [they] usually have less volatility.”54 
C. Chinese Walls 
Prior to developments in the interpretation of section 78j(b) of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934,55 the standard process for investment decisions 
by a trustee was to “seek[] out and evaluate[] information” from all files and 
personnel across departments within the financial institution.56 It was ex-
pected that any special skills or knowledge should be “put to use for the 
benefit of ... trust beneficiaries.”57 However, as previously noted, the Cady, 
Roberts decision limited the sources of information that managers were 
permitted to use when investing fund assets.58 
                                                 
49 Many large custodians, the banking entities that hold the lenders’ securities, have a 
securities lending division within their corporate structure. See id. at 40; see also Stephen 
Bier et al., Overview of Fund Securities Lending Programs, 124 BANKING L.J. 654, 656 
(2007) (discussing the care required in selecting a securities lending agent). 
50 See Pollack & Weaver, supra note 47, at 223. 
51 Gregory J. Lyons & Michael P. McAuley, Securities Finance: Case Study of the Reg-
ulatory Roadmap Necessary to Navigate the Challenges in the New Financial Services 
Environment, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., Nov. 2010, at 1, 2–3. 
52 See Pollack & Weaver, supra note 47, at 223. 
53 Timothy DeLange & Ian Berg, Other People’s Money: The Unrealized Conflicts of 
Securities Lending, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (June 17, 
2010, 9:18 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/06/17/other-peoples-money
-the-unrealized-conflicts-of-securities-lending/. 
54 Id. 
55 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
56 Herzel & Colling, supra note 18, at 76–77. 
57 Edward S. Herman & Carl F. Safanda, The Commercial Bank Trust Department and 
the “Wall,” 14 BOS. C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 21, 24 (1972). 
58 Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC 907, 907–08 (Nov. 8, 1961). 
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Less than a decade after Cady, Roberts, the SEC urged financial services 
institutions to adopt and adhere to internal policies to guard against disclosure 
of confidential information.59 These internal policies sought to prohibit com-
munications between commercial lending or underwriting activities (private 
side) and trust department activities (public side).60 More recently, the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has required that national banks 
that exercise fiduciary authority must follow written policies and procedures 
to “ensure[] that fiduciary officers and employees do not use material inside 
information in connection with any decision ... to purchase or sell any securi-
ty ... and prevent[] self-dealing and conflicts of interest.”61 
Before identifying the components of Chinese Walls, it is important to 
pinpoint what type of information they attempt to block. Although there is 
no clear definition of MNPI,62 some categories of sensitive information may 
be considered material.63 Examples include nonpublic information about fi-
nancial results, future earnings projections, impending bankruptcy or finan-
cial liquidity problems, or changes in senior management.64 “In short, ma-
terial nonpublic information is any information which, if publicly disclosed, 
could reasonably affect the price of the stock,”65 or be a significant factor 
in altering an investment decision.66 However, advantages gained by a se-
curities investor through its own efforts “derived from publicly available 
                                                 
59 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Exchange Act Release No. 34-8459, 43 
SEC 933 (Nov. 25, 1968) (accepting an offer of settlement for violations of anti-fraud 
provisions by Merrill Lynch for disclosing to customers confidential information obtained 
in connection with its underwriting business). This case marked “the first formal Chinese 
Wall in the securities industry pushed for by the regulatory agency.” Stanislav Dolgopolov, 
Insider Trading, Chinese Walls, and Brokerage Commissions: The Origins of Modern 
Regulation of Information Flows in Securities Markets, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 311, 347 
(2008) (arguing that the creation of Chinese Walls regulation came about because of the 
demise of the fixed brokerage regime on the New York Stock Exchange). 
60 Herzel & Colling, supra note 18, at 79–80. 
61 Fiduciary Activities of National Banks, 12 C.F.R. § 9.5 (b)–(c) (2012). Investment 
managers, who also function in a fiduciary capacity, are required to maintain and enforce 
policies and procedures to prevent the misuse of nonpublic information; however, latitude 
is given to advisers to take into consideration the nature of its business in deciding on 
specific measures. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4a (2006). 
62 2 MICHAEL B. SNYDER, HR SERIES COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS § 11:211 (2011). 
63 See Tower C. Snow, Jr. et al., The Return of Insider Trading and Related Developments 
Under Rule 10b-5, in THE ART OF COUNSELING DIRECTORS, OFFICERS & INSIDERS: HOW 
WHEN AND WHAT TO DISCLOSE 131, 154–55 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course 
Handbook Ser. No. 1083, 1998). 
64 Id. 
65 3 ROBERT B. HUGHES, LEGAL COMPLIANCE CHECKUPS: BUSINESS CLIENTS app. 23-
3 (2009). 
66 See Snow et al., supra note 63, at 146. 
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information” are not prohibited, even if the conclusions drawn from such 
information are nonpublic.67 
The characteristics of a Chinese Wall depend on the size and structure 
of the bank or financial holding company.68 A common method is the phys-
ical69 and/or functional70 separation of the lending and trust departments.71 
At a minimum, Chinese Walls may be erected by internally distributing a pol-
icy statement outlining the purpose and basic provisions of the information 
barrier.72 An independent compliance department may review trades and ac-
tivities to ensure adherence to the policy statement.73 Restricting access to 
computer databases containing sensitive documents is another technique 
aimed at prohibiting misuse of confidential information.74 Other characteris-
tics include implementing educational programs for employees, eliminating 
shared committee membership between the departments, and establishing 
protocols to deal with accidental communications.75 Large law firms have put 
into place similar policies and procedures to avoid conflict of interest prob-
lems between different clients and the lawyers who assist those clients.76 
It is necessary that some individuals be allowed to cross the Chinese 
Walls to perform their responsibilities within the corporation,77 most notably 
                                                 
67 Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material 
Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 883 (2010). All traders are not required to 
have equal information before trading. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 (1983). 
68 See Herzel & Colling, supra note 18, at 88. 
69 Mèndez-Peñate, supra note 18, at 686. 
70 See Sheldon I. Goldfarb, Chinese Wall Policies and Procedures, at 809, 813 (PLI 
Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 692, 1990). Functional separations 
attempt to avoid the intermingling of bank departments that possess private information 
by separating tasks and activities in which staff from each department engage. Id. 
71 See id. 
72 See Mèndez-Peñate, supra note 18, at 685. The statement may include procedures 
that should be followed by persons responsible for private information. Herzel & Colling, 
supra note 18, at 88. 
73 See 3 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON 
SECURITIES FRAUD § 6:274 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing Chinese Walls procedures ordered 
by a recent bankruptcy court decision). Personnel responsible for private information may 
be required to sign a letter acknowledging they are aware of the restrictions. Id. 
74 See Harry J. Weiss, Outline for Enforcement Session: SEC and SRO Enforcement 
Developments, in COPING WITH BROKER/DEALER REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT 2008, 
at 49, 135 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1701, 2008). 
75 Herzel & Colling, supra note 18, at 88–91. 
76 See Charlotte M. Fischman, Client Conflicts: The Large Law Firm Experience and the 
Use of the Chinese Wall, at 69, 98–100 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook 
Ser. No. 365, 1988). 
77 See Mèndez-Peñate, supra note 18, at 699–700. 
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senior executives.78 Directors and senior officers “stand[] astride the wall 
[and are] faced with a seemingly impossible task of maintaining a dichoto-
my of mind between information gained” from various departments.79 Di-
rectors and officers are often not involved in the individual trades performed 
by trust department managers;80 however, some specific instances have 
been reported where senior management had specific knowledge of and in-
volvement in trust department activities.81 Trust department employees, and 
the senior executives who supervise them, are under no fiduciary duty to 
seek out inside information for the benefit of the managed trusts,82 but max-
imizing profits through increased brokerage and performance fees provides 
a strong incentive to exploit such information.83 
Restricted and watch lists have been suggested as a method to supple-
ment Chinese Walls.84 When the commercial lending department enters into 
a relationship with a client, and therefore gains access to nonpublic infor-
mation, the client’s name is added to a firm-wide list that prohibits the trust 
department from recommending that client’s securities.85 Therefore, no con-
flict of interest exists that may lead to disclosure of nonpublic information.86 
There are two main problems that restricted lists present. First, the mere fact 
that a client is on the restricted list suggests something that has the potential 
                                                 
78 See Theodore A. Levine et al., An Overview of Compliance Policies and Procedures 
for Multiservice Financial Institutions, at 731, 762–63 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Ser. No. 692, 1990). Others allowed to cross the barrier include lawyers, 
accountants, and appropriate research personnel. Id. 
79 Steven R. Hunsicker, Conflicts of Interest, Economic Distortions, and the Separation 
of Trust and Commercial Banking Functions, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 611, 645 (1977) (arguing 
that it is economically feasible to completely separate trust and commercial departments 
to avoid conflicts of interest). 
80 See Herzel & Colling, supra note 18, at 92 n.54. 
81 See Louise Story, JPMorgan Accused of Breaking Its Duty to Clients, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 10, 2011, at B1. 
82 See Herzel & Colling, supra note 18, at 86–87. 
83 See Hunsicker, supra note 79, at 643–44. 
84 Slade v. Shearson, Hammill, & Co., 517 F.2d 398, 403 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding that 
constructing Chinese Walls alone is not a sufficient bar to liability in the case that a trust 
department solicits customers for a corporation’s securities when the investment banking 
department knows of inside information pertaining to the corporation that is contrary to 
the assertions of the trust department). 
85 See id. The list can prescribe that certain actions may or may not be taken with regards 
to a corporation’s securities—exceptions relating to whose account is permitted to trade in 
the security (proprietary, client, or employee), time limits on the restriction, and how to 
alter a previous recommendation of the security (buy, sell, or hold). See Levine et al., supra 
note 78, at 781–84. 
86 See Levine et al., supra note 78, at 785. 
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to affect the securities’ value.87 Second, large financial institutions deal with 
a vast number of corporations through various departments,88 and the range 
of securities that may be recommended would be greatly circumscribed.89 
D. Fiduciary Duty 
1. Duty of Loyalty 
Asset managers who exercise discretionary control in the management 
of an employee retirement plan are subject to provisions of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and have a fiduciary duty to the 
managed fund in that capacity.90 In order to state a claim under ERISA for 
breach of fiduciary duty, the pleading “must allege 1) that defendant was a fi-
duciary who, 2) was acting within his capacity as a fiduciary, and 3) breached 
his fiduciary duty.”91 
Element 2 implies there are instances where a fiduciary may act against 
the interests of the plan if done outside of its capacity as fiduciary.92 Pegram 
                                                 
87 Gorman, supra note 18, at 494–95. Depending on the way the restricted list is struc-
tured (what department placed the corporation on the list, what action is prescribed, and 
how long the client will be on the list), an analyst may be able to glean information from 
and hypothesize about the corporation merely because of its presence on the list. This is 
most pronounced when the corporation’s securities had previously been recommended by 
the analyst, providing grounds for even greater conjecture on the corporation’s future 
outlook. Id. 
88 The same client may also be using different departments simultaneously, such as a 
corporation issuing new securities through the underwriting division and receiving financ-
ing through the commercial lending division. 
89 See Levine et al., supra note 78, at 786. The effect on large banks would be extremely 
onerous, imposing a drastic solution that is not proportional to the problem it purports to 
solve. See Herzel & Colling, supra note 18, at 82–83. 
90 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)–(B) (2006). ERISA was enacted in 1974 to provide pro-
tection for employee benefits such as pension plans and welfare benefit plans. See Andrew 
M. Campbell, Annotation, Construction and Application of Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 et seq.) by United States Supreme Court, 150 
A.L.R. FED. 441, § 2 (1998). ERISA standards impose on plan fiduciaries more stringent 
requirements than does the common law of trusts. See Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan 
Investments in Employer Securities: More Is Not Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 61, 
70–71 (1998) (arguing that accumulation of employee retirement funds in pension plans 
insufficiently diversifies the employee’s portfolio and advocates for ERISA statutes that 
set a maximum limit on employee investments in ERISA pension plans). 
91 In re Morgan Stanley ERISA Litigation, 696 F. Supp. 2d 345, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (de-
nying defendant’s motion to dismiss because allegations were sufficient to state a claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty to avoid conflicts of interest, to prudently manage plan as-
sets, and to disclose material information to the plan). 
92 See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225–26 (2000) (allowing fiduciary plan man-
agers to act against the interests of the plan when the manager does so outside of its re-
sponsibility as fiduciary to the plan). 
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v. Herdrich specifically permits ERISA fiduciaries to wear multiple hats, 
or represent multiple interests, as long as they “wear the fiduciary hat 
when making fiduciary decisions.”93 This rationale has been extended to 
large financial services firms where fiduciary and non-fiduciary activities 
are carried out in various departments.94 Consequently, the plaintiff in a 
breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty claim must assert that the activity com-
plained of occurred while the defendant was administering to the plan in 
its fiduciary capacity.95 
Element 3 pertains to the nature of the transaction or activity that the 
plaintiff, the fiduciary plan trustee, complains of, not the capacity within 
which the fiduciary is acting as in Element 2.96 Fiduciaries must discharge 
their duties solely in the interest of participants, “for the exclusive purpose 
of[] providing benefits to participants and ... defraying reasonable expens-
es.”97 Implicit in this statute is the requirement that trustee fiduciaries act 
completely independent of conflicting personal interests.98 Prohibited trans-
actions due to conflicts of interest include (1) dealing with plan assets for 
the benefit of the fiduciary’s own account, (2) transactions involving the 
plan where the interests of the plan are adversely affected, and (3) receiving 
kickbacks from transactions involving the plan assets.99 
II. AFTRA RETIREMENT FUND V. JPMORGAN 
A. JPMC Repurchase Agreement with Sigma 
Sigma Finance was a special investment vehicle (SIV) that utilized 
short-term funding to invest in asset-backed securities and other long-term 
                                                 
93 Id. 
94 See EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26, 33 (N.Y. 2005) (stating that 
although Goldman Sachs was acting in a fiduciary role as underwriting advisor to a client, 
other underwriting activities on behalf of that client do not bring with them fiduciary duties). 
95 See In re WorldCom, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Pegram 
v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 226 (2000)). 
96 Id. at 758. 
97 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
98 See Dabney v. Chase Nat. Bank of New York, 196 F.2d 668, 670 (2d Cir. 1952). 
99 See 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1)–(3) (2006). It is argued that Congress deemed that some 
transactions by fiduciaries must be summarily avoided, and that the aims of the fiduciary and 
the plan are irreconcilable. Consequently, in such instances fiduciaries are completely barred 
from acting. See Laurence B. Wohl, Fiduciary Duties Under ERISA: A Tale of Multiple 
Loyalties, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 43, 59 (1994). The second prohibited transaction that is 
listed in the text above notes that certain transactions involving the plan are disallowed, 
which the court in Aftra v. JPMorgan emphasized in its opinion. See Bd. of Trs. of Aftra Ret. 
Fund v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 806 F. Supp. 2d 662, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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financial instruments.100 On September 30, 2008, the Sigma board of direc-
tors determined Sigma could no longer meet its obligations and should be 
placed in receivership.101 During the liquidity crunch, Sigma looked to 
JPMC for financing through repo agreements in place of traditional com-
mercial paper and term notes.102 Recognizing Sigma’s impending collapse, 
internal correspondence within JPMC’s investment banking division high-
lighted potential gains from the unwinding of Sigma and other similar shad-
ow banking entities.103 Through various repo agreement plans totaling near-
ly $13.5 billion, from February to August of 2008,104 JPMC’s investment 
banking division hand-selected collateral that gave it the best prospect of 
profit in the event of a Sigma default.105 
B. JPMC Securities Lending Agreement with Aftra 
In June 2007, Aftra used JPMC’s securities lending services to gain ac-
cess to $500 million in collateral from borrowers of its securities; Aftra then 
authorized JPMC’s asset management division to invest the collateral in Sig-
ma’s secured medium term notes (MTN).106 These MTNs allowed Sigma to 
retain the right to transfer specific assets to repo lenders, rendering those 
                                                 
100 See Alan S. Wilmit & Suzzanne Yao, Issues Relating to the Securities Lending and 
Collateral, in PENSION PLAN INVESTMENTS 2010: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES, at 479, 484 
(PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning, Course Handbook Ser. 907, 2010). Banks create SIVs by 
providing them with limited funding and making them standalone entities with no backing 
from the parent bank. Id. SIVs enjoyed lighter regulation than their depository institution 
counterparts, even though they serve a similar function. See Sarah Foster, Structured 
Investment Vehicles, in Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2009–2010, 29 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 1, pt. V at 33–34 (2009). 
101 In re Sigma Finance Corporation (in administrative receivership) and In re The Insol-
vency Act 1986 (Conjoined Appeals), [2009] UKSC 2, [2] (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
102 Paul J. Davies & Anousha Sakoui, Sigma Collapse Marks End of SIV Era, FIN. TIMES, 
Oct. 1, 2008, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/18fbcd5c-8fe4-11dd-9890-0000779fd18c.html. 
103 See Aftra, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 671–72. Specifically, JPMC executives outlined services 
that could be provided to Sigma and others involved in Sigma’s financing, such as advising 
Sigma noteholders on unwinding its portfolios, identifying Sigma assets that would be 
attractive purchases for JPMC, and protecting JPMC’s own monetary interests. Id. 
104 Id. at 675–76. These repo agreements were executed after JPMC executives recog-
nized Sigma was near bankruptcy. Id. 
105 Id. at 675. Aftra claims JPMC gained a profit of $1.9 billion from the cherry-picked 
collateral after Sigma’s collapse. Id. at 678. However, at the time of Sigma’s default, JPMC 
faced a nearly $383 million loss on the collateral; JPMC argues that its business decision 
to maintain possession of the collateral over a period of years (resulting in substantial 
asset appreciation) has no bearing on Aftra’s claim. Id. 
106 Id. at 670. The notes, which matured in June 2009, were AAA-rated and secured by 
Sigma assets. Id. 
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assets unavailable to MTN holders if Sigma defaulted.107 After Sigma entered 
receivership, Aftra recovered about six cents on the dollar for its MTNs.108 
C. Court’s Ruling 
1. Duty of Loyalty 
The court did not rule on Aftra’s claim that JPMC breached its fiduciary 
duty to prudently manage plan assets because it was not at issue in the par-
ties’ motions.109 JPMC’s motion for summary judgment was granted on Af-
tra’s claims for breach of duty of loyalty and duty to disclose.110 Judge 
Scheindlin determined, as a matter of law, “JPMC was not acting in a fidu-
ciary capacity when it extended repo financing to Sigma,” or when JPMC 
issued a default notice to Sigma, thereby seizing Sigma’s collateral.111 The 
duty of loyalty claim was of particular importance to the court’s analysis, 
and it failed because JPMC was acting in its capacity as creditor of Sigma, 
not fiduciary of Aftra, when the repo agreements were made and the default 
order issued.112 Congressional intent justified the holding, citing a calculat-
ed tradeoff between increasing capital formation and aligning financial ser-
vices firms’ bottom lines with the success of their clients’ investments.113 
D. Related Litigation 
As previously noted, the 2008 financial crisis caused many lawsuits 
against the financial services industry.114 Much of the litigation stemmed 
from negligence and breach of contract claims brought by class action plain-
tiffs115 whose investments had lost substantial value due to the wide-reaching 
impact of the subprime loan market and the resulting credit crunch.116 This 
                                                 
107 Id. at 670–71. JPMC’s Asset Management division was aware of the repo lender’s 
superior claim to Sigma’s assets vis-à-vis noteholders at least six weeks prior to Sigma’s 
collapse. Id. at 677. 
108 Id. at 677. 
109 See Aftra, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 666. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 691. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 691–92. 
114 See Meyerowitz, supra note 22, at 97. 
115 See Kevin J. Smith & Nicole M. Hudak, Financial Services Companies Fighting Neg-
ligence Claims, 128 BANKING L.J. 123, 123 (2011) (discussing how defendants may util-
ize a New York law that permits the dismissal of negligence claims where the defendant 
did not undertake duties outside those specifically enumerated in the contract). 
116 See Wayne W. Smith & Gareth T. Evans, Understanding and Dealing with the Current 
Securities Litigation Environment, in SECURITIES LITIGATION AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 7, 
8, 14–15, 51 (Aspatore, 2009). 
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Section considers litigation related117 to the Aftra Retirement Fund v. JPMor-
gan (Aftra v. JPMorgan) case. 
1. BP Savings Plan v. Northern Trust118 
The BP Savings Committee (BP Committee) entered into investment 
manager agreements (IMA) with Northern Trust to invest BP Committee 
assets (securities) in lending index funds.119 Northern Trust, through its se-
curities lending division, found borrowers for these assets and secured col-
lateral to invest for the benefit of the BP Committee’s plan beneficiaries.120 
When the fund containing the invested collateral lost substantial value in 
2008, the BP Committee was not allowed to withdraw the remaining collat-
eral according to the investment guidelines set forth in the IMA.121 
The BP Committee claimed that Northern Trust breached its fiduciary 
duties to prudently manage plan assets and disclose conflicts of interest cre-
ated by the collateral investment program.122 The BP Committee was suc-
cessful in its motion to dismiss Northern Trust’s claim seeking contribution 
and indemnification under ERISA,123 but the fiduciary duty claims have yet 
to be decided.124 
There are key distinctions that may place BP Savings Plan v. Northern 
Trust outside the scope of Aftra v. JPMorgan. First, the conflict of interest 
claim relates to Northern Trust’s activities within its fiduciary capacity as 
a securities lending agent,125 whereas Aftra’s claim involves JPMC’s ac-
tivities as a non-fiduciary commercial repo lender to Sigma.126 Second, at 
this stage in the pleadings, it has not been mentioned whether Northern 
Trust misrepresented the risk profile of the collateral pools. In Aftra v. 
JPMorgan, Sigma’s demise, according to JPMC executives, was extreme-
ly likely and the most advantageous approach for the JPMC commercial 
                                                 
117 Similarities are based on the factual circumstances surrounding the lawsuit and the 
claims asserted by the plaintiff. 
118 BP Corp. N. Am. Inc. Sav. Plan Inv. Oversight Comm. v. N. Trust Invs., N.A., 692 
F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
119 Id. at 981. 
120 Id. The collateral was invested in commingled pools, and the BP Committee had 
rights under the investment guidelines to portions of the pool’s assets. Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 981–82. 
123 Id. at 986. 
124 BP Savings Plan, 692 F. Supp. 2d at 986. 
125 Amended Complaint at 16, BP Corp. N. Am. Inc. Sav. Plan Inv. Oversight Comm. v. 
N. Trust Invs., 692 F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (Civ. Action No. 08 C 6029). 
126 Bd. of Trs. of Aftra Ret. Fund v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 806 F. Supp. 2d 
662, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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lending division was to profit from the bankruptcy while leaving the secu-
rities lending and asset management divisions to determine their own 
courses of action.127 However, since the Aftra v. JPMorgan and BP Sav-
ings Plan v. Northern Trust claims for breach of fiduciary duty to prudent-
ly manage plan assets have not been ruled on,128 the respective courts may 
determine that these differences are moot. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Are Chinese Walls a Defense to Breach of Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty Claims? 
Aftra’s theory of breach can be summarized in the following way: 
JPMC breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty to Aftra when it secured Sigma 
collateral through repo agreements, such that JPMC had a higher priority to 
Sigma assets than the Sigma notes in which Aftra had invested.129 Accord-
ing to Aftra, this was done by JPMC to capitalize on the potential profit 
from the more lucrative collateral at the expense of Aftra.130 The court dis-
missed this theory on the grounds that even though JPMC was acting as a 
fiduciary in its capacity as asset manager for Aftra, it was not a fiduciary to 
Sigma as a repo lender.131 
Closely mirroring the aforementioned argument is the Pegram v. Her-
drich court’s discussion of a fiduciary’s right to wear multiple hats as long 
as the fiduciary duty hat is worn when dealing with fiduciary plan assets.132 
Although this declaration fits nicely into academic discussions, it proves 
more difficult when applied to real-life situations. “Decisions [are not] made 
in a vacuum.”133 Decisions can rarely be isolated to represent the interests of 
a single client. Therefore, information barriers play an essential part in cur-
tailing conflicts of interest between different roles, or “hats.” 
JPMC confronted Aftra’s claim on the grounds that its information bar-
rier between the securities lending and commercial lending departments 
prevented a conflict of interest that would violate the duty of loyalty.134 
Proper information barriers appear to be a necessary link in the causal chain 
of Judge Scheindlin’s holding—if a fiduciary acts outside its capacity as 
                                                 
127 See id. at 674–76. 
128 Id. at 666; BP Savings Plan, 692 F. Supp. 2d at 986. 
129 Aftra, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 682. 
130 See id. 
131 Id. at 666. 
132 See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
133 STEPHEN P. ROBBINS ET AL., ORGANISATIONAL BEHAVIOUR: GLOBAL AND SOUTHERN 
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES 129 (2d ed. 2009). 
134 Aftra, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 682, 688. 
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fiduciary to plan assets, or in other words the fiduciary takes off the fiduci-
ary hat and puts another on in its place, there needs to be some tactic to in-
hibit the use of knowledge gained while wearing the fiduciary hat in making 
decisions outside of that capacity.135 Judge Scheindlin mentioned the effec-
tiveness of JPMC’s Chinese Wall policies136 but did not cite their use as a 
reason for rejecting Aftra’s claim.137 
This Section inspects the interaction between information barriers and a 
fiduciary’s ability to act outside of its fiduciary capacity to the detriment of 
the fiduciary’s client. It finds that when a plaintiff claims the defendant 
breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty due to a conflict of interest, the defend-
ant would be wise to raise two defenses. First, the defendant should assert that 
it was not acting within its fiduciary capacity when the breaching event oc-
curred.138 Second, the defendant should illustrate the effective information 
barriers in place between fiduciary and non-fiduciary departments.139 
1. Hypothetical140 
Martha gives Invest For You, Inc. (IFY) discretion to invest her retire-
ment assets, anticipating a reasonable return. IFY also lends money to local 
businesses. In Y-1, IFY decides to loan XYZ Corporation (XYZ) funds from 
its proprietary account, the loan being secured by XYZ property. In Y-2, IFY 
invests in XYZ debt on Martha’s behalf, as an unsecured creditor. At bank-
ruptcy in Y-3, IFY has a higher priority than Martha in collecting XYZ assets. 
What would be IFY’s best defense to a breach of duty of loyalty claim 
brought by Martha? If IFY offers the Hats defense, it must prove it was 
(1) acting outside of its role as fiduciary to Martha when it loaned funds to 
XYZ in Y-1, and (2) making decisions exclusively for the benefit of Mar-
tha in Y-2.141 Logically, Martha will claim IFY’s investment decisions per-
taining to her retirement assets were impaired or jaded by the commercial 
loan to XYZ of proprietary funds.142 How would the Chinese Wall defense 
                                                 
135 See generally id. at 685–86 (discussing fiduciary duties and information barriers). 
136 See id. at 688–90. 
137 Id. at 666. 
138 In the interest of brevity, this defense will be called the Hats defense. 
139 This defense is called the Chinese Wall defense. 
140 This Hypothetical is different from the Aftra v. JPMorgan case. Aftra asserted that 
JPMC breached its duty solely by creating a higher priority to Sigma assets compared to 
Aftra’s position. Aftra, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 682. The Hypothetical is used primarily to 
demonstrate the interaction between the Hats and Chinese Wall defenses. 
141 Aftra, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 680, 691–92. 
142 See Mèndez-Peñate, supra note 18, at 688–89. IFY may invest Martha’s retirement 
assets in XYZ in order to improve the likelihood that they collect on the commercial 
loans in the event of default; there are other reasons why an asset manager may invest 
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assist IFY in this situation? It would eliminate Martha’s aforementioned 
rebuttal to the Hats defense. Successfully raising the Chinese Wall defense 
will mean, theoretically, that IFY’s public and private side departments in 
charge of each of the respective transactions with XYZ were unaware of the 
other’s position.143 The defense allows an inference144 that IFY blocked the 
transfer of information about the commercial loan terms between the asset 
management and commercial lending departments. The nature and type of 
information allowed to pass between departments is a debated topic, and even 
the very mention of a client’s name between departments could bring liabil-
ity.145 As long as the court finds IFY’s information barrier to be sufficient, 
IFY can avoid liability under a plaintiff’s conflict of interest theory stem-
ming from the fiduciary duty of loyalty.146 
In the Hypothetical, as in Aftra v. JPMorgan, Martha may claim there 
is a duty to pass over, or scale, the Chinese Wall in order to protect the 
fiduciary client’s assets.147 The plaintiff’s theory would go something like 
this: Once IFY became privy to MNPI in its role as commercial lender to 
XYZ in Y-1, IFY should be required to disclose that information to the 
asset management department if the use of the MNPI could enlighten the 
investment decisions made on behalf of Martha’s assets.148 Wholly sepa-
rate from the above analysis is a claim of breach of the duty to prudently 
manage Martha’s assets, which may have some bearing on what infor-
mation IFY is allowed to pass between departments.149 
2. Additional Scenario Where the Hats and Chinese Wall Defenses 
May Be Proper 
In addition to the Hypothetical, other situations exist where the Hats or 
Chinese Wall defenses may help a defendant avoid liability on a conflict 
                                                                                                                         
Martha’s assets in XYZ, such as accumulating a corporation’s stock in the discretionary 
accounts of its clients in order to vote proxies in a way that benefits the asset manager but 
not the fiduciary clients. Id. at 690–91. 
143 In the event that IFY is comprised of a single individual, the Chinese Wall defense 
is purely artificial—the same person would be in charge of both investment decisions. 
144 Memorandum of the SEC in Support of Motion of Fidelity Management & 
Research Co. at 6–8, In re Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 144 B.R. 989 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
1992) (No. 1-90-00130). 
145 See Friend v. Sanwa Bank Cal., 35 F.3d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1104(a)(1)) (plaintiff claiming it is a per se violation of ERISA to have dual and con-
flicting fiduciary duties of loyalty). 
146 See Aftra, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 668–69. 
147 See id. at 689–90. 
148 See id. at 665–66. 
149 See Gorman, supra note 18, at 491–92 (identifying “catch-22” scenarios where 
compliance with Chinese Walls produces subpar results for fiduciary clients and potential 
breach issues for the fiduciary). 
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of interest claim under the fiduciary duty of loyalty. In an often-evolving 
industry, new and novel episodes of conflicting interests are ever-present,150 
and there are assuredly many more scenarios that may arise in the fiduci-
ary duty context than are shown here. 
A plaintiff may allege that it is a per se violation for a defendant to 
represent two fiduciary clients whose interests conflict.151 Often, this claim 
arises in the context of corporate executives who act in two roles: corporate 
officer and pension plan fiduciary for employee assets.152 In this type of 
scenario, a pension plan’s claim against the officer would invoke an argu-
ment similar to that of Aftra153—officers should utilize MNPI gained in 
their role as corporate officers (a fiduciary role to shareholders) when dis-
posing of pension plan assets. Corporate executive defendants can assert a 
Hats defense to show that when making decisions in a fiduciary capacity to 
pension plan beneficiaries, they did so independent of any other competing 
interests, and vice versa for actions in its fiduciary capacity to sharehold-
ers.154 In reaction to the same claim, a Chinese Wall defense may be called 
upon to protect the executive from the illegal act of transferring MNPI in 
violation of insider trading laws. Support for this argument comes from the 
rejection155 of the previously permissible activity of trustees seeking in-
formation from any source that would assist in making decisions benefi-
cial to the trust assets.156 
A claim for breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty due to a conflict of inter-
est should investigate two questions. First, is the fiduciary trustee acting 
within its capacity as fiduciary to the plan when a decision is made, or is a 
non-fiduciary hat on at the time of the decision?157 Second, was an effective 
                                                 
150 Joanna Benjamin, The Narratives of Financial Law, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 787, 
791–92, 796–97 (2010) (outlining the basic themes of the financial law and demonstrat-
ing its prominence in the industry). 
151 See Friend v. Sanwa Bank Cal., 35 F.3d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1994). 
152 Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995); In re Enron Corp. 
Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 550 (S.D. Tex. 2003). 
153 See Aftra, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 690. 
154 See Shelby D. Green, To Disclose or Not to Disclose? That Is the Question for the 
Corporate Fiduciary Who Is Also a Pension Plan Fiduciary Under ERISA: Resolving the 
Conflict of Duty, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 831, 852 & nn.118–19 (2007). Courts are split 
on when the Hats defense is appropriate; the determining factor appears to be when the 
decision regarding the pension plan is a business decision (amending a plan) or a fiduciary 
decision (offering new investment options to employees as part of their pension plan). Id. 
155 Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC 907 (Nov. 8, 1961). 
156 Herzel & Colling, supra note 18, at 76–77. 
157 Under the broad functional definition of fiduciary in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A), the 
question of whether the entity was acting in its fiduciary capacity will be a fact-intensive 
inquiry. See Thomas Gies, Current Issues in ERISA Fiduciary Breach and Benefit Claims 
Litigation, in PRACTISING LAW INST., ERISA LITIGATION 10 (2008). 
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information barrier in place to prohibit the transfer of MNPI between pub-
lic side (fiduciary) and private side (commercial lending or underwriting) 
activities?158 Depending on the plaintiff’s theory of breach, the first ques-
tion may end the inquiry. However, in most instances, as in the Hypothet-
ical above, the second question must also be addressed. 
B. An Alternative Theory of Aftra’s Breach Claim 
Judge Scheindlin noted on three occasions that Aftra’s theory of breach 
was not based on the belief that JPMC’s position as repo dealer influenced 
its decisions as fiduciary of Aftra funds.159 If Aftra had pled this theory, 
they would have been required to show JPMC engaged in a prohibited 
transaction where a conflict of interest existed.160 The factual evidence to 
assert this theory of breach would likely have come from internal JPMC 
correspondence between public and private side departments outlining their 
respective investments in a third party and how JPMC could benefit at the 
expense of Aftra. However, it is unlikely JPMC executives would have been 
naive enough to put such a plan in writing. Therefore, an inference would 
have been required by taking into account communications between the de-
partments where the assets of JPMC, Aftra, and Sigma are managed. The 
record indicates three exchanges, discussed below, where either 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1004(a)(1)(A) or 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2) could be implicated.161 
In the first communication (Email #1), a private side executive men-
tioned discussions he had with SIV market investors, including the JPMC 
securities lending division, about the likely upheaval of the SIV market.162 
After distribution of Email #1 to various public and private side executives, 
another communication (Email #2), sent on behalf of JPMC CEO Jamie 
Dimon, directed that a study be carried out by the asset management divi-
sion of the JPMC clients who had the most exposure to the SIV market, 
with a particular emphasis on Sigma.163 The third communication (Email 
                                                 
158 Whether the Chinese Walls guidelines are upheld in a particular case is a question of fact. 
Gary Barnett & Michael Herman, Selected Securities Law Issues with Respect to Commercial 
Mortgage-Backed Securities: Market-Maker Prospectus Delivery Requirement; Research 
Reports; Insider Trading Issues and Chinese Walls, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIZATION 
29, 55 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 732, 1995). 
159 See Bd. of Trs. of Aftra Ret. Fund v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 806 F. Supp. 2d 
662, 666, 685, 687–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
160 See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
161 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1)(A); 1106(b)(2) (2006). 
162 See Aftra, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 671–72. The email contained evidence of the SIV 
market panic and outlined possible profit opportunities due to the poor financial shape of 
the market. Id. 
163 Id. 
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#3), an email within the private side between executives, stated that the 
JPMC asset management division was a large purchaser of SIV and Sigma 
assets, and it questioned if a firm-wide position would need to be taken into 
consideration before entering repo agreements with Sigma.164 
The content of Emails #1 and #3 was permissible because the private 
side did not divulge any MNPI about Sigma; in fact, it was doing market 
research to decide if JPMC should lend to Sigma on a repo basis.165 How-
ever, Email #2 provides telling insight into the knowledge of wall-
straddlers.166 Because Dimon was privy to information on both sides of the 
Chinese Wall, his decisions are inherently suspect for a conflict of inter-
est.167 Dimon’s request for a study of exposures may indicate to the asset 
management department that something needs to be done regarding Aftra’s 
investment in Sigma,168 but it does not call into question its loyalty to Aftra. 
Both 29 U.S.C. § 1004(a)(1)(A)(i) and 29 U.S.C. § 1006(b)(2) are written as 
obligations on the fiduciary actor, not the non-fiduciary commercial lender.169 
In order to find a violation of these statutes, we must find evidence of the fi-
duciary acting within that capacity to the detriment of the fiduciary client.170 
No indication is given in Email #2 that Dimon directed the asset management 
department to maintain its position in Sigma’s MTNs (on behalf of Aftra) to 
help JPMC’s firm-wide position. Although courts are content to allow cir-
cumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences to prove intent in these types 
of cases,171 no such evidence appears in the record. Therefore, if Aftra would 
have pled a separate theory of JPMC’s breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty, it 
would probably not have prevailed on the facts provided. 
C. Solutions to the Chinese Walls and Duty of Loyalty Debate 
Debate against the consolidation of the financial services industry has 
only increased since the financial crisis of 2008.172 The number of conflicts 
                                                 
164 Id. at 673. 
165 Id. at 672–73. 
166 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
167 See Aftra, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 669, 689. 
168 Aftra’s duty to prudently manage plan assets was not decided on by the court. Id. at 666. 
169 Although they both may be part of the same commercial entity. 
170 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1)(A); 1106(b)(2) (2006). 
171 See Robert N. Eccles et al., Fiduciary Litigation Under ERISA, in ERISA LITIGATION 
555, 591 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Law Handbook Ser. No. 788, 2008) (cit-
ing Davidson v. Cook, 567 F. Supp. 225, 236 (E.D. Va. 1983)). 
172 Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, Policy Essay, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Pro-
prietary Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 515, 531–32 (2011); see also Sharon E. Foster, Systemic Financial-Service 
Institutions and Monopoly Power, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 357, 400 (2011) (discussing financial 
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of interest increase with the size of the financial institution and the types 
of activities in which it engages.173 Many solutions are proffered to deal 
with these conflicts, and two are inspected here. 
1. Breakup of Multiservice Financial Institutions 
One suggestion is to break up, or separate, the functions of multiservice 
institutions.174 This proposal attempts to segregate investment and commer-
cial banking activities, much like the GSA did in 1933.175 Under this pro-
posal, JPMC would be required to break up and disaffiliate public and pri-
vate side departments.176 Such a shift in the financial services landscape 
would have tremendous effects—impacting the securities market’s ability to 
raise capital177 and corporate profit margins,178 to name just one. 
Separation of public and private side businesses would have avoided the 
plaintiff’s perceived conflict of interest claim in Aftra v. JPMorgan.179 The 
JPMC asset management department would have been its own separate en-
tity and not subject to the influence of wall-straddlers, firmwide positions, 
or the like. Judge Scheindlin dismissed the disaggregation of financial ser-
vices because it would “negat[e] the legislative will and public policy ex-
pressed in decades of legislation and regulation.”180 The monetary costs of 
divesting and disaggregating the financial services industry would likely far 
exceed any benefit gained by omitting losses to investors due to perceived 
(or actual) conflicts of interest.181 
2. Restricted and Watch Lists 
Restricted and watch lists function to make both public and private side 
employees aware of clients who may present a conflict of interest to the 
                                                                                                                         
services institutions’ monopoly power and suggesting the Dodd-Frank Act gives insuffi-
cient authority to breakup these institutions on antitrust grounds). 
173 See supra notes 3–4, 11–13 and accompanying text. 
174 Poser, supra note 18, at 120. 
175 See generally Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 
162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
176 Poser, supra note 18, at 120–21. 
177 See id. 
178 See David L. Abney & Mark. A. Nadeau, National Banks, The Impassable “Chinese 
Wall,” and Breach of Trust: Shaping a Solution, 107 BANKING L.J. 251, 255–56 (1990); 
see also Mèndez-Peñate, supra note 18, at 703–04. 
179 See generally Bd. of Trs. of Aftra Ret. Fund v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 806 F. 
Supp. 2d 662, 690–91 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing why separation is essential to mini-
mize bias). 
180 Id. at 690 (citation omitted). 
181 See Herzel & Colling, supra note 18, at 74. 
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firm.182 The components of these lists vary greatly, from complete prohibi-
tions on trading (restricted list)183 to supervision of trading by compliance 
personnel (watch list) to ferret out conflicts of interest.184 
The record does not reflect if JPMC had either type of list in place at 
the time of the Aftra ruling. However, there are drawbacks to both ap-
proaches. If JPMC imposed restricted list requirements, either the public 
side or the private side would lose business, because if the private side is 
associated185 with a client or company, the other is restricted from dealing 
with that client, and vice versa.186 Watch lists require the involvement of 
the compliance department187 in both public and private side activities, 
greatly increasing compliance costs.188 Also, when more employees are 
permitted to stand astride the information barrier,189 the potential for in-
sider trading violations increases.190 Restricted and watch lists have been 
proven ineffective at improving Chinese Walls,191 and while the lists 
might have altered the decisions of JPMC executives in the Aftra case, 
they would pose a substantial cost if implemented as a mandatory fixture 
in the financial services industry.192 
CONCLUSION 
Conflicts of interest have long been an issue in the financial services in-
dustry because of the “complex and opaque web of relationships” and prod-
ucts offered by multi-service institutions.193 In an attempt to combat these 
                                                 
182 See Kenneth L. Josselyn, Legal Issues Relating to Offerings of “Securitized Deriv-
atives,” UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 2012, at 481, 490 (PLI Corporate Law 
& Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1928, 2012) (noting the importance of walling off 
MNPI in financial institutions). 
183 See Poser, supra note 18, at 118. When a client or security is on a restricted list, the 
client or security cannot be the subject of recommendations or be traded. Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Involvement would include, but is not limited to, being an underwriter for a company’s 
securities, commercial lender to a company, or asset manager to a company or entity. 
186 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
187 See Poser, supra note 18, at 118. 
188 See id. (suggesting increased internal costs due to the extra workload placed on the 
compliance department). 
189 See Hunsicker, supra note 79, at 645. 
190 See Poser, supra note 18, at 118. 
191 Gorman, supra note 18, at 494–95. 
192 Bd. of Trs. of Aftra Ret. Fund v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 806 F. Supp. 2d 662, 
690 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
193 See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Investment Recommendations and the Essence of Duty, 
60 AM. U. L. REV. 1265, 1282 (2011) (focusing on the conflict of interests stemming from 
the compensation structure of multiservice financial institution employees). 
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conflicts, firms establish walls between departments where those interests 
may conflict.194 Characteristics of these barriers, or Chinese Walls, range 
from disseminating a written policy that outlines prohibited communications 
between departments and employees to more expensive actions like physical 
separation of departments or sophisticated computer firewall protections.195 If 
MNPI passes over or is allowed to scale the Chinese Wall, then in a subse-
quent lawsuit for breach of fiduciary duty, the defendant has the burden to 
prove the information was not used illegally.196 
When a claim is not likely to prevail on Rule 10b-5 grounds because a 
functioning Chinese Wall was in place at the defendant’s institution,197 a 
plaintiff may claim the defendant breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty be-
cause of conflicting interests.198 Defendants have, among others, two possi-
ble defenses to this claim—the Hats and Chinese Wall defenses.199 When 
and in what circumstance these defenses may be used depends on the plain-
tiff’s theory of breach. 
The court in Aftra v. JPMorgan200 deemed the defendant’s Hats defense 
sufficient to rule in its favor on a motion for summary judgment on the plain-
tiff’s fiduciary duty of loyalty claim.201 Interestingly, the court appears to uti-
lize the Chinese Wall defense as a partial justification for its ruling.202 The Hy-
pothetical offers an examination of the relationship between these defenses.203 
In the Hypothetical, the defendant fiduciary profited from a commercial 
loan at the expense of its fiduciary client.204 The fiduciary may defeat the 
client’s duty of loyalty claim by showing it did not act in its capacity as fi-
duciary205 when collecting on the commercial loan. Because of the difficul-
ty in determining which hat a defendant is wearing at a particular moment in 
                                                 
194 See Herman & Safanda, supra note 57, at 21. 
195 See supra notes 68–75 and accompanying text. 
196 See SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1336–38 (11th Cir. 1998). 
197 See BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 73, § 6:274. 
198 See Christine M. Bae & Carlton R. Asher, Jr., Chinese Walls—Procedures and 
Remedies for Dealing with Conflicts of Interest and Other Abuses by Broker-Dealers in 
Connection with Conduct by Their Securities Analysts, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 
2002: TAKING CONTROL OF THE PROCESS, 123, 129–30 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Ser. No. 1327, 2002) (noting that the defendant’s liability in Slade v. 
Shearson was under a breach of fiduciary duty claim, not a 10b-5 violation). 
199 Bd. of Trs. of Aftra Ret. Fund v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 806 F. Supp. 2d 
662, 668–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 666. 
202 See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text. 
203 See supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text. 
204 See supra notes 140–47 and accompanying text. 
205 See 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2) (2006); supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
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time, the Chinese Wall defense complements the Hats defense by assuring 
the court that no MNPI was acquired by the fiduciary when it transacted in 
its fiduciary role.206 Although illegal,207 a client may argue for the fiduciary 
to pass MNPI over or through the information barrier. Wise financial insti-
tutions will construct Chinese Walls and document the effectiveness of the-
se measures in order to rebut a plaintiff’s duty of loyalty claim. 
Aftra could have brought its breach of duty of loyalty claim on an alter-
native theory, asserting that JPMC’s management of Aftra assets was influ-
enced by its repo positions with Sigma.208 Under this claim, a court must 
analyze internal JPMC correspondence in search of proof, by inference or 
circumstantial evidence,209 that executives forced or coerced JPMC asset 
managers into decisions relating to Aftra assets, which were not in the 
plan’s best interests. The inquiry is fact-specific and susceptible to failure 
because executives are unlikely to put such directives in writing that can 
later be divulged in discovery. However, this approach permits the plain-
tiff to put forth a theory that is not necessarily rebuffed by a defendant’s 
Hats defense. 
In response to the conflicts of interest in the financial services indus-
try, two proposals have been advanced to limit or eliminate fiduciary duty 
of loyalty claims. Complete divestment by a financial holding company of 
its public or private side operations would harm the financial services in-
dustry beyond any gain acquired by fiduciary clients from avoiding the 
issue of conflicting interests.210 Additionally, and perhaps more important-
ly, such an action would be incongruent with Congress’s intent in enacting 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.211 Restricted and watch lists are offered as 
alternatives to conventional Chinese Walls policies.212 Imposing broad re-
stricted lists on large multi-service financial firms eliminates many potential 
                                                 
206 See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
207 See Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC 907 (Nov. 8, 
1961). But see Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Inc., 517 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1974) (find-
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208 See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. 
209 See Eccles et al., supra note 171, at 591. 
210 See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text. 
211 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 
1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). 
212 See JEFFREY M. KAPLAN & JOSEPH E. MURPHY, COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND THE 
CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 24:20 (2011). 
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clients and securities from both public and private side functions,213 where-
as watch lists provide more opportunities for insider trading214 and increase 
costs by requiring additional compliance personnel to monitor trading. Al-
though Chinese Walls may be inept at protecting investors from large loss-
es,215 as in the case of Aftra v. JPMorgan,216 they will continue to occupy an 
important locus in the panorama of financial services regulation. 
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